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Introduction: Rendering legible Islamic imperial 
memories 
The chapter presents one framework of political formation, the umma, understood here as the 
global community of Muslims, and overlays this historical and contemporary assembly on 
that of the liberal citizenship of the nation state. It argues that the umma disrupts some of the 
assumptions of liberal citizenship, specifically the role of the individual and the secular 
characters of that citizenship. Such disruption is achieved through drawing on pre-colonial 
memories. In relation to the wider discussion on diasporic and transnational understandings 
of religious culture within established populations, this chapter traces how Muslims who 
settle in European societies interact with the norms of liberal citizenship found therein. It 
concludes that notions of citizenship as derived from historical imaginings of the umma can 
nonetheless largely accommodate themselves alongside a framework of liberal citizenship. 
Transnational Muslim solidarity or community does not entail an actual threat to liberal 
citizenship with regards to Muslims living in European countries, but it does question the 
liberal theoretical position regarding how communities are formed, presenting challenges to 
individualism. The presence of a conscious Muslim diaspora in liberal European countries 
serves Muslims in distinguishing between obligations towards God (ibidat) and obligations to 
community (mu’amalat), in two senses: the community of the transnational umma and the 
community of location or the established communities in which Muslim citizens find 
themselves. The heart of the chapter tackles the double identification of belonging – in both 
the local or particular setting and in the transnational sense, in which the umma was always 
intended – essentially investigating the tension between the umma as a notion of communal 
participation and the liberal notion of individualist citizenship. The chapter begins by relating 
imperial memories of the concept of the umma and then proceeds with a discussion of liberal 
citizenship, before interrogating the two understandings of community and asking whether 
and how there can be mutually beneficial borrowings and plural accounts of community. 
To use the term ‘imperial’ in contemporary political discussion has almost become a 
form of blasphemy, as it automatically connotes historical European colonialism. 
Blasphemous or not, this chapter will nonetheless utilise this term, resurrecting the pre-
Marxist usage and reclaiming the concept on the basis that not all empires and imperial 
processes were European or Western. A vast array of historical political assemblages were 
based on imperial polities, and to shy away from the term due to European embarrassment 
would be Eurocentric at best, but at worst ignore and render invisible political and communal 
legacies remembered in the fabric of communities originating outside the Western domain. 
Thus, the concept of imperialism utilised in this chapter broadens its employment from the 
economic model dominant in Marxist literature. While economics was a powerful aspect of 
Islamic imperialism, historically the role of law and religious ethos dominated. 
It must be emphasised that using the analogy of imperial memory is not to claim that 
the umma wishes the recreation of an empire. Nor does it necessitate an immovable set of 
concepts and beliefs. On the contrary, collective memories are malleable and can be re-
imagined to meet new conditions, as voiced by Evans and Phillips when they proclaim: 
Time is layered upon time so that one buried layer of history seeps through to the 
one above … the cumulative impact of these different layers is a past that is 
permanently present. (Evans and Phillips, 2007, p. 25) 
A return to what Michel Foucault describes as a ‘pre-liberal’ voice, here the Muslim umma 
may prove impossible, given the ‘totalizing discourse of Western, capitalist modernity’ 
(Shani, 2010, p. 210), but the dominance of liberal ideas of citizenship should not blind the 
onlooker to the existence and value of alternative frameworks that persist in its shadow. 
The umma rests on collective identity that exists in at least three forms: texts, 
practices, and memory. Texts range in existing literature from the Qur’an, Hadiths (sayings 
and doings of the Prophet), and diverse legal literature to written histories of Islamic empires 
and Muslim peoples. As Mandaville states, ‘to read is, of course, to interpret’ (Mandaville, 
2001, p.155). In this way, the reading of the past is contextualised by the needs and 
conditions in which they are being read. The second enduring legacy of Islam’s imperial past 
is the continuance of Islamic institutions and practices. These contain the performance of 
obligations to God (ibidat), which include the five pillars and other forms of pious practice 
that persist across the contemporary world wherever Muslims reside. These practices do not 
fit neatly into the liberal nation state structure: they assume solidarities that do not privilege 
the individual. Islam continues to be practised on a collective, rather than individual, basis. 
The continuance of Islamic practices, such as zakat (obligatory alms), although partly in the 
‘private’ domain, spill over to the public arena, causing problems for secular liberalism. 
Finally, Islam’s historic past remains prevalent in the memories of Muslim peoples. This is 
not to argue that memories are remembered in the same way by all Muslim people or even in 
the same way by a Muslim person throughout their lifetime. Aspects of history are 
emphasised, while others are glossed over or forgotten in relation to present needs, allowing 
memory itself to assist in the contextualisation of the present (Fortier, 1999, p.46). Texts, 
practices, and Islamic memory all originated and have developed from the early Islamic 
polities which emerged within an imperial context. Using the analogy of imperial memory is 
merely to posit that historical texts, Islamic practices, and rememberings are historically 
imperial in character and inherently emphasise collectivist and religious practices that work 
contrary to liberal concepts of individual citizenship. 
The Western imposition of the nation state did not destroy pre-existing assemblages in 
Muslim countries, but was superimposed upon existing political and social arrangements. 
Memories of historic Islamic imperial understandings of sovereignty, just governance, and 
community formations are being reawakened by a more politically conscious umma and 
diasporic Islamic networks to meet the challenges of the specific temporal conditions in 
which they operate. The umma is problematic to liberal notions of citizenship, as a popular 
notion exists that Islam is ‘repellent and strange … The notion commonly associated with it 
is the Sharia … which would seem to be incompatible with the rules of enlightened reason’ 
(Van Ess, 2006, p. 1). Islam may overlap geographically with liberal ‘spheres of influence’, 
especially in the case of Muslim diasporas in Europe, but operates ‘relatively independently 
of the circuits and networks that define the structure of global liberalism’ (Adamson, 2005, p. 
548). 
To identify why liberalism would view the umma as ‘strange’, this chapter employs 
Scott’s notion of spaces of ‘illegibility’ (Scott J. C., 1998), which are spaces of public life 
that are not easily accommodated into pre-existing state categorisations, that is, 
categorisations aimed to simplify and make ‘legible’ the actions of state citizens. 
State simplifications can be considered part of an ongoing ‘project of legibility’, a 
project that is never fully realized. The data from which such simplifications arise 
are, to varying degrees, riddled with inaccuracies, omissions, faulty aggregations, 
fraud, negligence, political distortion, and so on. (Scott, J. C., 1998, p. 80) 
That which the state cannot simplify is either not ‘seen’ or found to be irreconcilable. The 
umma is but one of many examples where the state’s attempts at simplification render their 
actual mechanisms ‘illegible’. Attempts to read the lived experiences and community 
behaviours of the umma through the lens of liberal nation state frameworks renders them 
apparently illegible, or they become a special case in political theory. What follows first 
outlines that which is seemingly readily legible in the European nation state, the concept of 
liberal citizenship, and then moves on to the illegible, that is, the umma in historical and 
contemporary articulations. 
Liberalism and the notion of individuality 
Liberalism is singled out in this discussion not because it is the only location of friction 
concerning the umma but because it is often argued to be the most problematic. Michael 
Doyle (1986, p. 1152) wrote in the late 1980s, ‘[t]here is no canonical description of 
liberalism’. Yet, the entire Western political system is founded on its principles, derived from 
the European Enlightenment (Ramsay, 2004, p. 1). The fundamental pillar of liberalism is the 
respect for individual autonomy (Haider, 2008, p. 7). This respect leads to a collection of 
rights pertaining to individuals that are seen to epitomise the liberal state; these include, but 
are not limited to, ‘equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private 
property, and elected representation’ (Doyle, 1986, p. 1151). Islam and liberalism are 
perceived to provide competing discursive opportunities (Adamson, 2005, p. 548). To assess 
the validity of such positions this section critiques the ontological groundings of liberalism. 
According to contemporary liberalism, ‘it is the rights and duties of citizenship which 
constitute the shared bonds of political community’ (Chandler, 2009, p. 62). The idea of 
Kant’s sovereign human being, a rational actor fully able to articulate and realise his wants 
and needs, heavily underpins liberal thought. When free, these individuals can come together 
and form society later. For Islam, the modus operandi is reversed: society is assumed to exist 
already – an Islamic society, that is – and its aim on the social level is to bring individual 
Muslims into that society (Labeeb, 2007, p. 72). Maureen Ramsay (2004, p. 32) sees Kant’s 
‘abstract individual’ as a fallacy; it is not realistic to believe in the existence of an ‘asocial, 
atomistic, solitary and self-sufficient individual’. The idea of individuals as ‘sole generators 
of their wants and preferences’ (Ramsey, 2004, p. 253) is misleading and critiqued by various 
theoretical paradigms, as individuals are, at the very least, influenced by their surroundings as 
much as they constitute them. For Ramsey, a liberal theory that pursues individual freedom 
with such a ‘radical conviction’ (2004, p. 253) may undermine the cause of justice. 
Contemporary debates on liberalism centre on agreement or disagreement with John 
Rawls’ concept in Political Liberalism (2005 [1993]). Whether one agrees with Rawls or not, 
his theory ‘dominates the field’, as writers on liberalism who disagree with Rawls have to 
justify why they do so (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 55). For Rawls, access to resources, education, 
and wealth, for example, affects social justice (Kymlicka, 2002, pp. 299–300). Therefore, 
some measure of redistribution is required by way of the state, which impinges on an 
individual’s absolute freedoms to provide equity in society. In essence, Rawls’ theory aims to 
provide a ‘level-playing field’ for all individuals of society, so that those less advantaged 
might achieve their worth. Consequently, this concept of freedom ‘directly derive[s] from 
views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man’ (Berlin, 1969, p. 134). The liberalism 
typified by Rawls derives its theory of equality not from a transcendental source of rights, but 
from the rationality of an individual. In this way, Rawls’ liberalism moves away from a 
universalised ‘ideal’. Ramsey (2004, p. 253) caricatures Kant’s ‘solitary and self-sufficient 
individual’, who by some abstract rationality comes to consensus with other abstract 
individuals. Rather, Rawls engages in a thought experiment that might still be abstract, but 
accounts for different notions of individuality, grounded in community (not everyone is 
assumed to have the same rationality when entering into Rawls’ thought experiment, but must 
instead take steps to mitigate their position in society). 
For Hamid Haidar (2008), Rawls’ liberalism is therefore more tolerant of alternative 
ideologies, and in particular Shi’a Islam. Haidar asserts that removing the secularism from 
liberalism helps to reconcile it with Islam. As liberalism is concerned with ‘tolerance, 
individual liberty, and rights’ and secularism with ‘separating life or politics from religious 
concerns’, a less secular liberalism may be easily reconciled with an Islamic liberalism 
(Haider, 2008, p. 21). The dominance of liberal ideals in the notion of citizenship means that 
the debate is almost always one of either ‘how best to raise Islam to a level where by it is 
compatible with liberalism’, or a zero-sum conceptualisation whereby only liberalism or 
Islam can exist in contemporary discussions of transnationalism. Such an embrace of 
teleology, wherein liberalism represents an inevitable stage of advancement for all peoples, 
problematically (and ironically) removes notions of pluralism from any such discussion, and 
imbues Europe and European heritage with a ‘pioneering agency’ (Hobson, 2012, p. 13) 
which non-Europeans are destined to emulate, but not innovate. 
John Schwarzmantel, by contrast, is very critical of any merging of religion in 
politics; for him, religion and liberalism are challengers for the same ontological space, 
incapable of living together as religion offers ‘illusionary consolations for poverty and misery 
in the real world which could in fact be cured by human action’ (2008, p. 120). In the 
teleological world view of liberalism, ever marching on towards progress, religion represents 
a ‘reversal of the modernist Enlightenment project’, and something to avoid (Schwarzmantel, 
2008, p. 121). Schwarzmantel’s preference for secular ideologies rather than religious ones 
lies in the fact that he sees religion as a particularly divisive form of cultural identification, 
undermining the unity offered by secular positions (Schwazmantel, 2008, p. 123). Arguing 
that we live not in an age of ‘post-ideology’, but in an age of postmodern rejection of grand 
narratives, Schwarzmantel maintains that ‘[a] more accurate view sees such post-ideological 
diversity as existing within and contained by a more pervasive dominant ideology of neo-
liberalism’ (2008, p. 168). Such a teleological view of progress is problematic as by singling 
out religious ideology as being divisive, he does not acknowledge the divisiveness of secular 
ideologies. Here, we argue rather that the focus of any perceived incompatibility between 
liberalism and religion can be more correctly attributed to a notion of universal individualism 
inherent in the liberal ideology, not to liberalism’s secular nature. The absolute priority of the 
individual undermines the cause of social justice, and so Ramsey concludes that ‘[t]o bring 
forward the emancipatory project of liberalism once embarked upon, we can retain the 
respect for the equal worth of each individual, but we must jettison the liberal conception of 
that individual and all that follows from it’ (2004, p. 254). 
Imperial memories and alternative citizenship: The 
millet 
Historical treatment of minority communities highlights the difference between the 
individualism practised by modern liberal states and the communitarianism of historical 
Islamic polities, wherein group tolerance was preferred over individual autonomy. The 
different minority groups in the Ottoman Empire, for example, were ‘permitted to practice 
their religions and earn their livelihood, as long as they deferred to Muslim authority and kept 
a low profile’ (Deshen, Shlomo and Zenner, 1996, p. 15), recognising that generally, with 
some contextual exceptions, only the other Abrahamic faiths, the ahl al-kitab, People of the 
Book, were afforded such a status. Perhaps one of the most striking aspects of contemporary 
Muslims is the apparent compatibility with loyalties both larger and smaller than that to the 
nation state; both transnational and local. In part, these compatible loyalties can be explained 
by a sense of religious solidarity with the umma and a shared legal code which transcends 
nation state boundaries. However, there are also memories of historical imperial political 
systems that both allowed and encouraged differing loyalties to flourish under one political 
framework. 
The enormous geographic expanse of the Ottoman Empire incorporated many ethnic 
groups of differing religious orientations. Even those of the same religion had traditions that, 
in practice, differed substantially from one area to the next. In order to accommodate the vast 
array of peoples, the Ottomans preserved the existing laws and codes of religious 
communities called millets. In creating the millet system, the Ottomans created a dual loyalty 
to the Ottoman Sultan and the Empire on the one hand while retaining original loyalties to 
existing religious and geographic groupings on the other (Shaw, 1962, p. 617). The example 
of the Prophet and al-rashidun (the Prophet’s immediate successors) served as the basis for 
the institutionalisation of the millet system by Ottoman law, derived from the Constitution of 
Medina and the contract established between the Prophet Muhammad and People of the 
Book. Islamic sanctioning of the millet system was granted from the Qur’anic ruling that 
People of the Book should be entitled to, and granted, protection (Toynbee, 1955, p. 122). 
The Ottoman Empire was not the only Islamic assemblage to utilise the precedent of the 
Constitution of Medina, but as one of the largest and most enduring Islamic empires, the 
legacy of the millet system is profound. 
People of the Book could expect the right of protection and autonomy within their 
millet on the proviso that they carried out their duty of respecting the laws of the empire 
outwith their individual communities and paid their due taxes to the sultan’s government. The 
millet system comprised non-territorial autonomous groups, intermingled geographically 
throughout the extensive territory of the empire. It is important to note that the millet system 
did not offer equality. Different rights and obligations existed for Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Within the millet system the fusion of religion and politics was evident. The religious leaders 
of the various millets were recognised in the Ottoman capital as political rulers of their 
communities. This imperial memory contains within it a blueprint for legal pluralism, but one 
which is hierarchically structured. The hierarchy evident in Islamic legal pluralism may seem 
to contradict the egalitarian assumptions of liberal pluralism, although arguably the latter too 
contains a silent hierarchy<xen>1</xen>, whereby the individual is privileged over the 
collective group and the secular deemed more ‘rational’ than the publicly religious 
practitioner. The form of group tolerance shown by the millet system did not privilege the 
rights of the individual; while autonomy was granted within groups legally and culturally, the 
individual had to be affiliated to a community. If a person denied all faith and thus became 
kufr (an unbeliever), it was a crime punishable by death. In this regard Will Kymlicka 
describes the Ottoman method of rule over minorities as ‘antithetical to the ideals of personal 
liberty’ (2002, p. 231). However, a degree of historical symmetry is neglected by Kymlicka. 
Regarding the equality of persons and personal liberty in the millet example, it is clear that 
the egalitarian nature of Islam is as chequered as that of political liberalism. While Islam 
freed people of the Middle East from the authority of kings hundreds of years before Europe 
did the same, it quickly reverted back to hereditary royal authority. Likewise, Islam provided 
an unheard-of level of women’s and minority rights at its inception, although these rights are 
often perceived as stagnant and insufficient with the advent of social or democratic 
liberalism. Until the advent of the twentieth century, however, they still remained far greater 
than those offered by Europe in relation to property and divorce. 
To hold up the record of historical Islamic governance against that of modern-day 
liberalism is a fallacy, as liberalism too has its dark periods (not least the Jewish pogroms, 
European witch-hunts, colonisation, racial segregation, and women’s subordination). 
Domenico Losurdo points out, for example, that ‘[s]lavery is not something that persisted 
despite the success of the [eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European and American] 
liberal revolutions. On the contrary, it experienced its maximum development following that 
success’ (2011, p. 35). Political liberalism has matured over hundreds of years, yet even now 
is argued by Mark Duffield to have maintained large zones of exception across the world, 
which ensure ‘our’ liberties by denying ‘theirs’, whoever they may be (Duffield, 2007, p. 
192), much in the same way that ‘exception clauses’ (Losurdo, 2011, p. 342) have allowed 
for ‘liberal’ slavery and ‘liberal’ colonialism. The notion of the individual so venerated in the 
liberal tradition was historically a limiting term that did not cover various peoples, from non-
white peoples to women, to those who did not own property. In short, despite the place of 
dhimmis as subordinated under Islamic rule, Islam has a strong egalitarian current that 
maintains that ‘[m]ost noble among you in God’s eyes is he who fears God most (Qur’an, 
43:13). This Qur’anic verse is often used to show that there is no social distinction between 
Muslims, except that of piety. 
Approaching an Islamic citizenship through the 
umma 
For many, the umma is simply a body of pious believers distinct, and separate, from temporal 
political practice and thought. Yet, in an era of globalisation, issues concerning identity and 
community formations spill into the political domain both intentionally and unintentionally. It 
is salient to note Juergensmeyer’s account of Western nationalism as espoused by theorists 
Kohn and Emerson: 
When Kohn and Emerson used the term nationalism they had in mind not just a 
secular political ideology … but a particular form of political organization: the 
modern European and American nation-state. In such an organization individuals are 
linked to a centralized, all embracing democratic political system that is unaffected 
by any other affiliations …. That linkage is sealed by an emotional sense of 
identification with a geographic area and a loyalty to a particular people and identity 
…. (Juergensmeyer, 1994, p. 14) 
Striking is the assumption of supreme loyalty to the territorial nation state. The individual is 
presumed to be incorporated into one political assemblage which is ‘unaffected by any other 
affiliations’ (Juergensmeyer, 1994, p. 14). The concept of the umma therefore adds confusion 
into the heart of theoretical frameworks that take for granted supreme loyalty to the state. 
Despite the apolitical stance of many Muslims, the umma is deemed a political ‘problem’ in 
relation to liberal citizenship and transnationalism, and thus the community of believers 
becomes a political issue regardless of whether the community wishes it to be so. This issue 
has become even more pronounced over the last several decades with the rise of 
Islamism.<xen>2</xen> 
Despite the nation state framework dominating many theories on Islamist ideologies 
and practices (Esposito, 2002; Kepel, 1994; Kramer, 1996; Roy, 2004), an imperial paradigm 
may be more appropriate. Islamist movements repeatedly refer to the Islamic imperial 
framework through references to the model of the first Islamic polity formed by the Prophet 
and the early Islamic community: 
They call for a return to Islam. Behind this call was the belief that it was Islam that 
had united the tribes under Muhammad, inspired the early expansion and conquests, 
informed the glories of Islamic empires and civilizations, and served as a motivating 
force in revivalist reforms … the lessons of faith and history were clear …. Coping 
with modernity did not require new, foreign-inspired alternatives when the 
community (umma) had a tried and true faith and way of life. (Esposito, 1998, p. 
161) 
If the umma ‘had a tried and true faith and way of life’, what then might it look like, as 
inspired by the Prophet and his earliest followers? And, more pressingly for the discussion at 
hand, why is it perceived as antithetical to liberal citizenship? 
Majid Khadduri describes a dual agreement amongst the Muslims of Medina to 
explain the transition of sovereignty from the Prophet Muhammed to his successors. He 
explains: 
Under Muhammad not only the executive, but also the legislative and judicial 
functions of Allah were united … In more precise terms we may argue that only the 
possession of sovereignty resided with Allah, while its exercise was delegated to 
Muhammad. (Kadduri, 1955, p. 10) 
During the Prophet’s lifetime, a single contract sufficed to justify a Muslim’s loyalty to the 
Prophet. As Muhammed’s authority was synonymous with God’s, granting sovereignty to 
Muhammed was tantamount to granting sovereignty to God. With the death of the Prophet, 
those who had interpreted their contract to lie with Muhammed sought to reject the authority 
of Medina, the capital of the nascent Islamic polity. Those who interpreted their contract to 
lie with God were left to appoint a successor to Muhammed, ‘entrusted with the execution of 
the divine commands which were still binding upon the Muslims’ (Khadduri, 1955, p. 10). 
Using an example derived from imperial memory, the riddah wars fought under the caliph 
Abu Bakr between 632 and 634 set the precedent for punishment for apostasy as death 
(Ayoub, 2004, p. 74). Importantly, punishment was not immediately executed and allowed a 
period for repentance (Peters and De Vries, 1976–1977, p. 6). This example demonstrates the 
importance of the contractual agreement with God. 
Khadduri identifies the two contracts used to delineate sovereignty in the period of the 
rashidun, following the death of the Prophet and the end of a singular contract. These were as 
follows: first, a contract between the Muslims and God and Muhammed, represented by 
submission to Islam, the declaration of faith, shahadda; and second, a contract between the 
Muslims and the Caliph (or approximate leader), the Muslims empowering the Caliph to 
enforce the divine law (Khadduri, 1955, pp. 9–12). These two contracts, and the inference 
that a Muslim polity necessarily enforces divine law, lie at the heart of what makes 
overlaying the imperial assembly over the notion of liberal citizenship so problematic. There 
can be no space in liberal citizenship for the enforcement of divine law if that enforcement 
undermines the autonomy of the individual. Equally, it underlines tensions within liberal 
theory. If the right of the individual, including the right to personal religious freedom, is to be 
taken seriously, then the right to practise religious law collectively, at least in the private 
domain, has to be accommodated. 
Abdul A’ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami in British India in the 1940s, 
identified a distinction between a ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ state (Ayubi, 1991, p. 128). These 
two concepts coincide with Khadduri’s two contracts, but Maududi articulated them in the 
form of two different kinds of sovereignty, political and legal. ‘Political sovereignty thus 
naturally means ownership of the authority of enforcing legal sovereignty’ (Maududi, 1960, 
p. 18). Here, Maududi introduced a hierarchy to the dual contract. The one pertaining to legal 
sovereignty is superior to the one pertaining to political sovereignty. Legal sovereignty is also 
referred to as the ‘Divine Code’ or hakimiyya (‘the sovereignty of God’) by Maududi, and in 
this way he finds space for God, through the shari’a, to legislate in the state. The political 
sovereignty he describes is that of a ‘vicegerent of God’, and therefore, ‘the scope of its 
activities will naturally be restricted within the limits ordained by the Almighty Himself’ 
(Maududi, 1960, p. 27). In this way, he does not contradict the Qur’anic injunction in chapter 
2, verse 229, ‘[t]hese are the limits ordained by God; so do not transgress them’ (Qur’an, 
2:229). 
If Muslims, by virtue of their shahadda, automatically abide by the first contract with 
God and the prophet Muhammed, then does this ensure that the Muslim diaspora, in feeling a 
sense of solidarity with other Muslims through the umma, must pose a threat to liberal 
citizenship? Not necessarily. Referring to imperial memory once again, the authority of the 
rashidun was ‘indistinguishable from the public body’ (Rahman, 1979, p. 79) in their time, 
but under the Umayyad dynasty of the seventh and eighth centuries, authority became 
distanced from civil society. The death of the Prophet and an end to direct access to divine 
guidance for Sunni Islam meant that the need for a second contract to legitimate authority in 
the Islamic polity was evident (a legitimation achieved in Shi’ism through the Imams). 
The second contract is an explicitly political contract compared to the first, which is 
overtly religious in nature. The second contract relates to life in the temporal world. The 
distinction between the temporal and the transcendental is one that recurs in Islamic 
discourse. Much of the ambiguity about political guidance in Islamic source texts centres on 
temporal and transcendental aspects of the shari’a. The first contract is grounded in religion 
and is an authority that ‘will be useful for life in both this and the other world’ (Rahman, 
1979, p. 79). The second is an authority that is based on an ‘intellectual (rational) basis’ 
(Rahman, 1979, p. 79) and is only of benefit to this temporal world. When Muslim 
contractors agree to the second contract, they are agreeing primarily to prevent anarchy that 
would lead to the demise of humanity. As an ideal, they are empowering the Caliph to 
enforce the divine law as agreed in the first contract. This second contract is built on the first, 
in the hierarchy that Maududi alludes to. The first, shahadda contract, binds Muslims to the 
law, and ‘[t]he law … precedes the state: it provides the basis of the state’ (Khadduri, 1955, 
p. 16). Does the shari’a restrict the ability of the polity to function, or of Muslim citizens in 
European countries to be part of a liberal citizenry should they wish? 
Here, it is argued that in certain circumstances the Muslim contractor, in agreeing to 
the second political contract, is not necessarily advocating or asserting the enforcement of 
divine law. In such circumstances, the political authority has perhaps succumbed to the evils 
that can result from it, ‘such as tyranny, injustice, and pleasure-seeking’ (Ibn-Khaldun, 1958, 
p. 391). If such a case was not possible, then for what reason does Ibn Khaldun, a Muslim 
proto-sociologist of the fourteenth century, expound upon a taxonomy of the various 
authorities in Muslim lands? In fact, there is a difference between a caliph (or ‘imam’, which 
Ibn Khaldun uses as an approximate term) and a sultan or mulk (king). The former satisfies 
both contracts with the Muslims and the latter only the second in its purely temporal nature. 
Both are possible, and it is conceivable for Muslims to consent to both types of authority. If a 
Muslim is able to practise their faith, then the first contract is upheld. That the second 
contract is not used to its full advantage, to uphold and enforce Islamic values in a given 
territory, does not mean that its lesser function, that of maintaining government, is not of 
value. Upholding government is necessary for Muslims to practise their faith. 
A second argument countering the blending of religion with politics is contained 
within the work of Piscatori, who uses Qur’anic verse and historical precedent to show how 
Islam endorses a pluralistic political life, thereby nullifying the universalism of the faith in 
the realm of the political. Among many verses used by Piscatori to this end<xen>3</xen>, the 
most poignant is chapter 42, verse 8, which states, ‘[i]f God had so willed, He would have 
made them one community’. This verse lays the foundations for ideological and political 
divisions in Muslim territory, where law, politics, and territory need not be contiguous. On 
historical precedent, Piscatori references the pacts made by Muhammed with the Jews of 
Medina (as in the millet system), the Christians of Aqaba and the polytheists of Mecca. After 
the period of al-rashidun he points to the Umayyads’ relationship with the Byzantines, where 
one caliph established truce and tribute with the Byzantines and another accepted aid from 
them to decorate the Prophet’s Mosque and the Great Mosque in Damascus. ‘The Abbasids 
rather more routinely concluded treaties with foreigners’ (Piscatori, 1986, p. 49), and during 
the Crusades several formal treaties were established between the Muslims and the European, 
Christian kings. Piscatori concludes that, against the perceived universality of Islamic 
politics, ‘Muslim rulers found no difficulty at all in having formal diplomatic dealings with 
non-Muslims when it was necessary to do so’ (Piscatori, 1986, p. 49). Despite the current 
dominance of the nation state system which presumes a singular centralised political system, 
past and present political assemblages allow for the possibility of multiple political 
configurations to exist in the same place simultaneously for reasons of expediency. 
Therefore, if Sunni Islamic social contract does not always demand that political authority 
apply the shari’a at state level, so long as that authority does not impinge on Muslim rights to 
adhere to the primary tenets of shari´a on a personal level, then from this reading the 
ideological, political, and territorial universality of Islam are not as absolute as we might 
believe. 
There is one further reason to contest the idea that it is the potential mixing of religion 
and politics within Islam that is problematic to liberal citizenship. Mohamed Arkoun makes 
reference to ‘secular religions’ like Marxism and Fascism and believes that secularism and 
religion have common features (Arkoun, 1998, p. 218). John Gray elaborates on these 
common features and comments on the similarities between the religious fundamentalism of 
al-Qaeda and other Western, secular, political ideologies. It is not, for Gray, religion that 
causes what is considered ‘irrational’ behaviour, but rather the characteristics of political 
modernity that do so. Al-Qaeda’s assertion that they can create a perfect order on earth is a 
peculiar myth shared by Nazism, Communism and liberal positivism (Gray, 2003, pp. 1–4). 
The only difference between religious brutality in the past and contemporary religious or 
ideological brutality is that previously damage was done to individuals and society for the 
sake of life after death, whereas now it is done for the sake of an idealised utopia that can be 
realised in the here and now (Gray, 2003, p. 117). 
Can the umma and liberal citizenship be 
compatible? 
Having explored two frameworks of citizenship, one liberal and the other Islamic, this final 
section explores the way in which the two historical systems, when placed alongside one 
another, need not be perceived as entirely conflicting arrangements, although important 
differences remain. Liberal and Islamic notions of citizenship equally derive from an embrace 
of the value of pluralism, necessitating a truncating of both liberal individualism and the 
Muslim call to the ‘oneness’ (tawheed) of the Islamic message in the practice of politics. An 
overemphasis on the universalism of both liberalism and Islam leads to the conclusion that 
the two positions are necessarily the basis of ‘clash’-based politics (Huntington, 1996, p. 
253). Conversely, an understanding of the pluralism also embedded in liberalism and Islam 
can help to conceive of them as spaces to move within, rather than fixed points to clash over 
(al-Ghannoushi, cited in Esposito, 2001, p. 174). 
Michael Walzer’s communitarian argument in Spheres of Justice argues for an 
inherent plurality in the notion, or better put, notions of justice (1983, p. 4). Speaking directly 
to the atomism of liberalism, he claims that ‘[w]e cannot say what is due to this person or that 
until we know how these people relate to one another through the things they make and 
distribute. There cannot be a just society until there is a society’ (Walzer, 1983, pp. 312–313). 
However, Walzer’s communities and societies are idealised, generally culturally homogenous 
ones that deny the historical and contemporary violence needed to create them as such 
(Bader, 1995, p. 217). There is a conspicuous lack of recognition that societal structures 
sometimes perpetuate themselves not through consenting agents, but rather though 
‘mirror[ing] the balance of power of the various groups within them and the conventions and 
customs of the economic and political practices in which their members are engaged’ 
(Bellamy, 1992, p. 249). Veit Bader (1995) highlights that Walzer is over-reliant on the state 
to provide a sense of ‘closure’ to his community and to prevent the splintering of people into 
smaller and smaller groups. The state, for Walzer, is ‘necessary and legitimate to defend 
shared meaning, values, and ways of life’ (Bader, 1995, p. 213). Such an argument, however, 
‘clings to the superposition of ethnic, cultural, and national identities and citizenship’ (Bader, 
1995, p. 213). This notion sits uncomfortably with the concept of the umma which is 
perceived to exist despite the individual units of territorial states and not because of them. 
So, on the one hand liberalism’s universalism denies cultural or ‘lived’ truths, while 
on the other hand a communitarian perspective alludes to a community that bears little 
resemblance to multicultural realities. If it is true that ‘[j]ustice is relative to social meanings’ 
(Walzer, 1983, p. 312), then operationalising that dictum is proving difficult in the 
contemporary world. For example, when an individual considers a practice within the 
community, they are a part of unjust, does that imply that the individual is – or should be – no 
longer part of that community? Such a view would see a gradual splintering of ‘community’ 
into ‘a thousand petty fortresses’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 39). The notion of Islamic citizenship 
through the umma can circumvent this problem by the emphasis on a dual contract between 
the individual and government, which can be applied specifically in circumstances that would 
otherwise lead to community friction and fragmentation. 
Recalling the dual contract following Majid Khadduri, one contract is between 
Muslims and God through the declaration of faith (shahadda) and a second between the 
Muslim and a temporal authority. Arguably there is a third contract. The shari´a distinguishes 
between explicit obligation to God (ibidat), which entails the performance of the five pillars 
and obligations and duties towards the community, and to humanity as a whole (mu´amalat). 
The mu’amalat refers to the broad range of activities and behaviours that are commanded, 
forbidden, and allowed within society. A plethora of activities and behaviour is subsumed in 
this contract, including the forbidding of murder, the duties of economic welfare, and proper 
conduct towards animals and the environment. It is therefore unnecessary for Muslims fully 
to succumb to liberal ideas of citizenship in order to be active and participating citizens of 
society: the practice of mu’amalat already ensures this. Such a separation of sovereignty 
allows for Muslims who live in non-Muslim territory, as long as the temporal authority does 
not impede upon the individual’s ability to fulfil the first contract. Likewise, employing this 
reading, in Muslim territory any method of government is acceptable and does not contravene 
God’s sovereignty, insofar as the Muslim temporal power respects the commitment to the 
first agreement. 
Connecting the discussion of liberalism and communitarianism to the citizenship of 
the umma, it is noted that the first agreement, between the Muslim and God, resembles the 
universalism of liberal notions of justice in two ways. First, just as liberalism is a broad and 
contested tradition, a Muslim’s concept of what constitutes his or her agreement with God in 
his or her declaration of faith is also contested beyond the five pillars. Second, both 
liberalism and the shahadda, while contested, assume a certain agreement in what constitutes 
the core tenets of those terms. The extent of this agreement may well be thin and certainly 
does not extend to separate ‘doctrines’, be they between the market liberalism of Friedrich 
Hayek and the communitarian liberalism of John Rawls (Bellamy, 1992, p. 218), or the 
Sunni–Shi’a divide. The significance of both a commitment to liberalism and the Muslim’s 
declaration of faith lies in the shared universalist tendency that tries to give both concepts 
meaning detached from the social context in which they are used. The second of Khadduri’s 
contracts, between the Muslim and the temporal ruler, resembles the communitarian 
commitment to deriving meaning from social context. As Muslims need not be bound under 
Khadduri’s second contract by any transcendental commandments about the institutional 
practice of the economy<xen>4</xen> or governance, it is up to human ingenuity to develop 
a model for the pragmatics of politics. 
There is, however, a great difficulty in trying to accommodate both the universalism 
of the shahadda and the specificity of the different cultural and religious practices of 
Muslims. Islam can be interpreted to rest on certain truths, broadly understood as the 
universal pretensions of Khadduri’s first contract (with God), in other words, divine truths 
that exist independent of social context. On the other hand, the interpretivism of Islamism and 
the different communities within which Muslims find themselves living broadly maps on to 
the cultural specificity of communitarianism and is inherently bound to and reliant upon 
social context. While separating the two notions in a dual contract allows the resolution of 
this tension theoretically, in practice these Muslim contractors are asked simultaneously to 
embrace universalism and particularism and to keep the two conceptually separate as they go 
about their lives. Such a situation is not without precedent in the imperial assembly, a legacy 
from al rashidun. Local custom and law were accommodated in the expansion of the nascent 
Islamic polity, so long as they did not contradict the pillars of Islam. 
Conclusion 
The history of alternative political assemblies in the Muslim world is one that is carried by 
Muslim diasporas as they settle in regions of the world, like Europe, that do not share their 
heritage. However, the feeling of community with other Muslims, the transnational umma 
identity that Muslims can access, creates a conundrum for the secular, liberal identity of state 
citizenship. When we examine the place of the individual in liberal citizenship, we see that 
the notion of deriving values abstractly and applying them universally does not adequately 
account for the communal construction of those values. In this respect, the umma sits on the 
other end of this spectrum, insisting on the presence of community before establishing the 
values that constitute the basis of that community. Taking another unit of analysis as the base 
point of society – the community rather than the individual – is not unique to Islam and is 
inherent in many religious and non-religious paradigms (Durkheim, Marxism, feminism, 
post-postivist theories). In some ways there is a clear basis to the umma, the Muslim’s 
declaration of faith, but if the Muslim’s duties to the umma are defined as mu’amalat 
(obligations to the community), then what is less clear is how to articulate these duties in a 
de-territorialised, uncentralised umma that shares its members with the nation state. 
Using the historical foundations of Islamic imperial rule, this chapter has 
demonstrated how the notion of community has played a historical role in the formation of 
Muslim identity and its values. Muslim memories of this ‘alternative’ practice of citizenship, 
explored through the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, centred on communal tolerance, 
rather than individual freedoms and thus may be seen as incompatible with liberalism. 
Comparing the imperial system with contemporary liberal citizenship suggests that there may 
be a beneficial exchange between members of a transnational diaspora and the particular 
communities they live in. For members of the Muslim diaspora, accommodation to aspects of 
liberal citizenship can help distinguish between those aspects of the faith that are 
transcendental and those aspects that are subject to re-interpretation in different geographies 
and temporal settings. In this respect, the experience of the European Muslim living within 
the contemporary confines and obligations of the nation state, while simultaneously 
embracing the memory of alternative (religious and communal) forms of citizenship, works 
to undermine the notion of a ‘monolithic’ Islam that is singular in purpose and meaning, and 
always at odds with liberalism. It also challenges liberalism to take seriously the individual 
right to religious freedoms and to confront the contradictions within itself. 
Notes 
<en-group type=‘endnotes’> 
<en><label>1</label> All are equal so long as the division between public and private is 
maintained, thus ensuring liberal secular notions remain dominant. </en> 
<en><label>2</label> The authors note the difficulty of defining ‘Islamism’ but utilise it 
here to broadly describe a variety of differing movements that have arisen in response to the 
challenges of secular modernity, and specifically the decline and eventual abolition of the 
Caliphate. Islamism is not a monolithic movement so crucial difficulties arise in utilising a 
singular category to describe movements with divergent aims and strategies, and yet the 
familiar link between them all is the consciously held ideological position that Islam requires 
political expression, thus providing an overt rejection of secularism. Contemporary Islamism 
has its roots in the eighteenth century, but the number of groups advocating Islam as the 
political solution to modern challenges has increased particularly with the rise of 
globalisation from the 1970s onwards. </en> 
<en><label>3</label> See Qur’an, 49:13, 4:59 and 42:8, and Piscatori, 1986, pp. 45–46. 
</en> 
<en><label>4</label> Certain economic commandments are contained within the first 
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